Commission for Historical Clarification - Guatemala
Historical background
In November 1950, Jacobo Arbenz was elected to the Presidency of Guatemala. In 1952, he undertook an agricultural reform programme which included the nationalisation and redistribution of unused arable land, in particular the land belonging to the United Fruit Company (A United States Multinational) Being in the throes of McCarthyism, the United States seemed to see this policy as being a bridgehead to communism in Central America. The legalisation of the communist party and the importation of arms from Czechoslovakia, a Soviet satellite, by Jacobo Arbenz stirred the White House and the CIA into setting up operation PBSUCCESS. This operation came to an end in 1954 with Arbenz being sent into exile and the establishment of a military regime led by Colonel Carlos Castillo Armas.
In 1958, Colonel Armas was assassinated and General Ydigoras took over command of Guatemala. By way of reaction to the increase in dictatorial regulations by this regime, an uprising of young defiant officers as well as people from the countryside took place in 1960. This was the start of a civil war which was to last for 36 years. Up until 1982 a succession of military or pro military governments, organised countless campaigns aimed at annihilating the rebel factions.
The coup d’état By General Efrain Rios Montt in March 1982 was to herald the darkest moment in the history of Guatemala. The latter, shortly after taking power, set up Civilian Defence Patrols(PACs), militias recruited by force from the army whose objective was to eradicate the guerrillas. The General put into operation his “scorched earth” policy. With this, 440 villages were completely annihilated and close to 200’000 Mayans were either massacred outright or thrown from helicopters into the Pacific Ocean. Some 40’000 refugees fled to Mexico. The guerrillas reacted by combining and forming an armed movement, the Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (UNRG).
On 8 August 1983, Rios Montt was overthrown by his own Defence Minister, General Oscar Humberto Mejia Victores, who in turn assumed power. In July 1984, he began a process which allowed a managed return to democracy in Guatemala, beginning with the establishment of a Constituent Assembly. This Assembly adopted a new constitution on 30 May 1995 and a new President, Vinicio Cerezo was democratically elected in January 1986. His successor Jorge Serrano tried unsuccessfully to foment another coup d’état but shortly afterwards was deposed and fled the country.
On 29 December 1996, an historic agreement was reached with the guerrillas and the conflict was brought to an end. Alvaro Arzu became President in 1996. Democratic elections were held in 1999. The Presidential mandate of Alfonso Antonio Portillo Cabreras began on 14 January 2000. Oscar Rafael Berger Perdomo, the current President, came into office in 2004.
Mandate
The beginning of peace negotiations can be traced to the signing in Oslo (Norway) on 23 June 1994, of the Agreement on the Establishment of the Commission for Historical Clarification (http://www.c-r.org/our-work/accord/guatemala/historical-clarification.php) This agreement provided for the creation of a Truth Commission in order to clarify the human rights violations which had caused the Guatemalan population to suffer, connected with the armed conflict. A further task of this Commission was to furnish a report based on objective investigations and to formulate specific recommendations to further peace in Guatemala, including measures to preserve the memory of the victims, to foster a culture of mutual respect and observance of human rights and to strengthen the democratic process.
Its mandate covered the entire period of the civil war from 1960 up until the signing of the 1996 accord under the auspices of the UN. It did not have at its command any judicial powers. Furthermore, the greater part of its individual conclusions could not lead to the bringing of judicial proceedings due to the adoption, in 1997, of an amnesty law which, despite the fact that it excluded cases of torture, forced disappearances and genocide from its application, nevertheless offered significant protection to a good number of human rights violators.
Composition
The Commission was presided over by Dr. Christian Tomuschat (Germany) assisted by Otlia Lux and Alfred Balselle Tojo (Guatemala) and by a team of around 100 people from 31 different nationalities.
Operations
One of the first difficulties with which the Commission was confronted was that of its financing, and the Commission had to delay the start of its activities several times.
Due to the fear on the part of the people from the countryside and the after effects of the war, many people did not give testimony before the Commission. Of 8000 depositions made, the Commission proceeded with in depth investigations of only 80 cases. Finally, the Commission encountered disputes with the government and the armed forces when trying to obtain information, despite the fact that the accord setting up the Commission, and ratified by the government, clearly set out the commitment of the latter to take part, assist and provide all information necessary to the Commission.
Report
The Commission report, entitled “Guatemala: Memory of Silence” was made public on 25 February 1999. In the opinion of the Commission, the roots of the internal armed conflict are to be found in the very nature of the Guatemalan State which is described as being from its foundation “an authoritarian State which excluded the majority of the population, was racist in its precepts and practises, and served to protect the economic interests of the privileged minority.”. The report decried the fact that “the violence was fundamentally directed by the State against the excluded, the poor and above all, the Mayan people, as well as against those who fought for justice and greater social equality.” and that when faced with movements proposing economic, political, social or cultural change, the State increasingly resorted to violence and terror in order to maintain social control.
Other causes of violence were pointed out: the inefficiency of the judicial system and the historically powerful influence of the military over the judiciary, which permeated the country with a culture of impunity. Furthermore, according to the Commission “ a whole network of parallel systems of repression rendered the judiciary functionally inoperative by usurping their functions and prerogatives. Indeed, a totally illegal and covert repressive system took over, orchestrated and controlled by the Military Intelligence Services. This system was further secured through the “direct or indirect cooperation of the all powerful economic and political sectors”
The report qualified as being “acts of genocide” the human rights violations perpetrated by the army against certain ethnic groups, notably the Mayans, and attributed responsibility to the various security forces for 93% of the violations committed during the civil war, with 4% being attributed to non-identified forces and 3% to the guerrillas. The Commission identified a total of 42’275 named victims, of which 23’671 were victims of arbitrary executions and 6’159 of forced disappearances. Of the victims identified, 83% were Mayans. According to the Commission, the total number of victims of this “dirty war” was over 200’000.
The Commission issued a list of recommendations aimed at “reinforcing the hope of the Guatemalan people that its violent history would never again be repeated”. These recommendations requested that the government adopt the necessary measures to ensure compensation for the victims of violence, the preservation of the memory of the dead, the establishment of a culture of peace and the reinforcement of democracy.
Postscript
The position of the government on this report, which was made public on 16 March 1999, fell well short of the expectations of civil society. Besides the fact that the former did not summon up the means proposed by the Commission concerning the search for the disappeared victims and reparations for their close relatives, the government refused to implement the idea put forward in the report to set up a special body in charge of inquiring into the behaviour of the army under the pretext that this institution had already been “reformed”.
REMHI (Catholic Church's Project for the Recovery of Historical Memory)
This report had already drawn the same conclusions as the Truth Commission. The report, entitled “Nunca Mas” (Never Again), was published on 24 April 1998 within the scope of an church project called REMHI on the recovery of historical memory. It collected more than 40’000 testimonies and presented and analysed information taken from the tens of thousands of cases of serious human rights violations committed during the 36 years of civil war. It also established the responsibility of the army in 90% of the recorded cases of abuse. Two days after the publication of the report its instigator, Monsignor Juan Gerardi was assassinated. His death was seen as an attempt at destabilising the work of the REMHI, at putting pressure on the people who had given testimony and at putting a stop to the search for truth. However it did not succeed: the following year the Commission for Historical Clarification was established.
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